O n January 20, 2015, a member of our hospital family, Michael Davidson, a young cardiovascular surgeon and interventionalist who had trained and then stayed on at Brigham and Women's Hospital, interrupted his clinic to speak with the adult son of a deceased patient. The son shot Michael and then himself. Michael was rushed to the Emergency Department and then the operating room where colleagues from several specialties spent the rest of the day attempting to repair his multiple injuries. His pregnant wife, Terri Halperin, a plastic surgeon who had also trained with us, waited upstairs. His injuries eventually proved fatal.
any interventions that would have prevented this incident, we have made some changes that will strengthen our procedures and hopefully begin to reassure our staff who have inevitably felt vulnerable. For example, we added key card locks in some areas and additional panic buttons in others. We hired an external security consultant to review all our processes and we are implementing the recommendations. We reviewed the placement of metal detectors at our entrances, a solution that most health-care facilities have chosen to forgo because it is nearly impossible logistically with more than 25,000 people accessing our facility daily and seems antithetical to our identity as a safe haven and welcoming environment. In fact, the data suggest that metal detectors are likely to prevent less than a third of these unusual episodes. 3 Finally, although we had previously implemented a de-escalation strategy for threatening behavior in the inpatient areas, we are expanding and adapting this protocol to our ambulatory sites although again de-escalation would not have been possible in this instance.
We were not unprepared for this incident. Beginning in 2012, spurred by active shooters in Aurora, Colorado and Newtown, Connecticut, our emergency management team had prioritized an active shooter event in its hazard vulnerability analysis. In the course of such an analysis, we prioritize planning, mitigation, response, and recovery activities and assess our needs as an institution. Our staff had participated in a number of exercises to prepare for such an event. We performed drills in close collaboration with law enforcement, fire, emergency medical services, clinicians, and administrators. These exercises had the added benefit of building a level of teamwork and trust within our organization, helping us to clarify how each arm of the hospital can best leverage its strengths.
Drills and exercises are still inadequate to prepare a staff of 17,000 people to execute the specific procedures necessary during a live event. Thus, we created an instructional video dramatizing an active shooter scenario within our own facility. We deliberately chose plain language, dispensing with jargon like ''Code Silver'' in favor of more explicit terms like ''active shooter,'' ''life-threatening situation,'' and ''shelter in place.'' Some staff members had provided us earlier feedback that they could not immediately recall the meaning of all the various color-based codes. We recognized that our public address code announcements, such as ''code gray'' for a security issue and ''code blue'' for cardiac arrest, were designed to activate a specific response by a trained cadre of responders. In contrast, the warning for an active shooter event needs to alert everyone-all the 25,000 visitors, patients and family members inside our walls each day-so transparency, clarity, and timely communications were our focus.
We also examined the value of social media. During the Boston Marathon bombings, individuals near the scene posted a massive amount of useful intelligence to social media sites, enhancing situational awareness. However, due to the lack of sensitivity or specificity of these reports, some of the posts contained misinformation. 5 In 2014, we participated in the first national symposium on active shooters in hospitals and health-care settings, organized by the Johns Hopkins Office of Critical Event Preparedness and Response. 6 The meeting gathered expert panelists to discuss complicated issues including providing care to a shooter. Patient abandonment, particularly the dilemma that providers face in choosing to ''run, ''...You've got to remember that things as bad as this and a hell of a lot worse have happened to millions of people before and that they've come through it and you can too. You'll bear it because there isn't any choice-except to go to pieces. . . . It's kind of a test, Mary, and it's the only kind that amounts to anything...'' James Agee, A Death in the Family 1 hide, or fight'' or continue administering care, was identified as the highest priority issue to address in hospital policy. Panelists also highlighted the danger to providers who enter ''hot zones'' to rescue the wounded, and risk endangering themselves in the process. We discussed the use of tactical Emergency Medical Services (EMS) teams, activation of trauma versus code teams, continuity of critical operations, the Hartford Consensus (a protocol for surviving active shooter events), 7 and the postevent mental health needs of staff. A strong consensus emerged that hospital policy must address the providers' aim to provide help even when they themselves are not safe. We integrated many of those lessons into our response plans.
Our after-action review did reveal some key lessons. Our video and exercises had helped. Those who had seen the video beforehand or had participated in an exercise relied on the recent training. One provider, who was in the immediate vicinity of the shooting and who had watched the active shooter training video only a few weeks earlier, said, ''I knew exactly what to do.'' Viewing the video had been elective; now it is mandatory.
Our plain language in warnings was still not plain enough. Transparent and timely communications are essential. As reports of a shooting hit social and mass media, leaders rounded throughout the hospital, ensuring that staff texted, called, and emailed loved ones to ease their concerns. We were transparent with our patients, some of whom learned of the event on social media or television within minutes of its occurrence. We also teamed with the Boston Police Department to push out messages on social media, including Twitter and Facebook, and updated our website as events unfolded. Shortly after the event, the hospital held a joint press conference with Boston Police to deliver a very clear status report, emphasizing that there was no longer an active threat. Still, the media knew within hours that Michael was the victim, which highlighted our need for improved privacy measures and we will continue to try to educate our staff around this.
Recovery efforts began almost immediately with the team of more than 30 who cared for Michael in the operating room. After an initial debriefing the evening after surgery, our peer support team, psychiatry, psychiatric nurses, social workers, chaplaincy, and our employee assistance group held support sessions. The focus rapidly expanded from Michael's immediate caregivers to the cardiovascular service and then the entire staff. The Brigham still in many ways feels like a small institution, and Michael was a beloved member. Although we have all developed mechanisms for helping our patients deal with such random events, the death of a colleague, particularly in this context, throws us off balance-in addition to our sorrow, we all feel vulnerable.
Institutional leadership played a major role in mitigating that pain. We established a fund to support the future educational needs of Michael's children, distributed Michael J. Davidson buttons, held multiple prayer services, erected a memorial in our main lobby to allow people to post messages, created an online guest book for those who were not onsite (almost 5000 messages were shared), and held a community moment of silence on the 1 month anniversary with hospital leadership, the mayor, and the Boston Police Commissioner meeting with cardiovascular staff. As many have written, compassionate leadership is crucial in the wake of these events to permit employees to express and deal with their agony 8 ; for us, this initiated a healing process that is ongoing. We could have done even more of this.
The emotional toll on our staff was significant; the resilience of our organization and its individuals has been tested. Four major snowstorms, and the task of implementing the EPIC electronic health-record system, helped divert some of our attention. However, the most common question at our debriefings is still, ''Why?'' The rate of mass shootings has tripled since 2011 according to a Harvard School of Public Health report, and as we struggle with this epidemic, we continue to ask what our role is as physicians, nurses, health-care workers, and public health advocates. 9 Sadly, we have now joined those communities that have experienced the trauma of an active shooter. We lost a beloved colleague, a member of our hospital family. Our after-action review has unearthed lessons and actions as we balance openness and security for our patients, families, and staff. We remain resolute in our commitment to prepare and train our community for any eventuality.
